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Grounding and Necessity
STEPHAN LEUENBERGER
Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of Glasgow, UK
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ABSTRACT The elucidations and regimentations of grounding offered in the litera-
ture standardly take it to be a necessary connection. In particular, authors often assert, or
at least assume, that if some facts ground another fact, then the obtaining of the former
necessitates the latter; and moreover, that grounding is an internal relation, in the sense
of being necessitated by the existence of the relata. In this article, I challenge the
necessitarian orthodoxy about grounding by offering two prima facie counterexamples.
First, some physical facts may ground a certain phenomenal fact without necessitating it;
and they may co-exist with the latter without grounding it. Second, some instantiations of
categorical properties may ground the instantiation of a dispositional one without neces-
sitating it; and they may co-exist without grounding it. After arguing that these may be
genuine counterexamples, I ask whether there are modal constraints on grounding that
are not threatened by them. I propose two: that grounding supervenes on what facts there
are, and that every grounded fact supervenes on what grounds there are. Finally, I
attempt to provide a rigorous formulation of the latter supervenience claim and discuss
some technical questions that arise if we allow descending grounding chains of transfinite
length.
Not all facts are metaphysically brute. Rather, some hold in virtue of
others, or because of others. Conversely, some facts ground other facts.
The notion of grounding and its cognates can be used to articulate
important philosophical theses. For example, physicalism is naturally
taken to be the claim that all facts are grounded in some physical facts.
More generally, there is a systematic connection between the notion of
grounding and the more familiar notion of fundamentality: fundamental
facts are those that are not grounded by other facts. Likewise, there is a
systematic connection between grounding and explanation: by citing its
Correspondence Address: Stephan Leuenberger, Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of
Glasgow, Glasgow, G12 8QQ, UK. Email: stephan.leuenberger@glasgow.ac.uk
Inquiry, 2013
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.855654
© 2013 Stephan Leuenberger. Published by Taylor & Francis.
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribu-
tion, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. The moral
rights of the named author(s) have been asserted.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 G
las
go
w]
 at
 01
:33
 23
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
14
 
grounds, one can, in principle, provide an explanation for a non-
fundamental fact.
Recently, philosophers have attempted to clarify the notion of grounding,
and to regiment its use. Among other things, they have examined candidate
principles that articulate links between grounding and some of its other
conceptual neighbours, besides fundamentality and explanation.
How does grounding relate to necessity, and to modality in general? Once
upon a time, grounding would have been taken to be analysable in broadly
modal terms, such as necessitation or supervenience. Such analyses have
fallen out of favour. Still, it is tempting to think that grounding is a
metaphysically necessary connection. After all, grounding is a species of
metaphysical determination, and metaphysical determination—in contrast
to nomic determination—leaves no room for contingency. In one version or
other, the conclusion of this tempting line of thought seems to be widely
accepted amongst theorists of grounding. For example, Fine writes that the
relation of grounding ‘is like that of consequence in that a necessary con-
nection must hold between the relata if the relation is to obtain’.1 Correia is
more explicit about what its being a necessary connection is supposed to
involve: ‘Necessarily, if the fact that A is grounded in some given facts, then
it is impossible that the latter facts all exist but fail to ground the fact that
A.’2 With varying levels of explicitness and commitment, Witmer et al.,
Audi, de Rosset, and Rosen, and Trogdon also endorse that view.3
Despite its popularity, the claim that grounding is a necessary connection
seems to me mistaken. In my view, grounding is no more a necessary
connection than causation is. My aim in this paper is to liberate it from
the shackles of metaphysical necessity. If I were to succeed, this would be
good news for those wishing to use grounding as a philosophical tool. For a
close connection to metaphysical necessity would severely constrain its
deployment. Put simply, it would not allow interesting grounding claims to
be true. For example, it would rule out the truth of physicalism too easily—or
so I shall argue.
Where does the tempting line of thought go wrong? Grounding is, of
course, a species of metaphysical determination. To deny that would be to
change the topic. But why should we accept that metaphysical determination
1Fine, ‘Pure Logic of Ground’, 1.
2Correia, Existential Dependence, 61.
3Witmer, ‘Intrinsicality without Naturalness’; Audi, ‘Clarification and Defense’; de Rosset
‘Getting Priority Straight’; Rosen, ‘Metaphysical Dependence’; Trogdon, ‘Grounding’.
Schaffer, ‘Least Discerning’, 321, denies that grounding requires necessitation. He allows that
a substance grounds its modes, even though it would be a category mistake to say that it
necessitates them. His view is compatible with necessitarianism about grounding as a relation
among facts. Trogdon, ‘Grounding: Explanation vs. Dependence’, diagnoses an ambiguity in
our grounding talk and rejects necessitarianism on one of the disambiguations. He still accepts it
for grounding in the sense of metaphysical explanation, the notion I am concerned with here.
2 Stephan Leuenberger
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is a matter of metaphysical necessity? Not because it is a species of determi-
nation—determination relations may be contingent, as we know from the
case of causation. Nor because it pertains to metaphysics—metaphysical
theses may well be contingent, as the recent debate about contingentism
has reminded us.4 Nor should we insist that grounding is a matter of
metaphysical necessity because it is both a determination relation and per-
tains to metaphysics—to do so would be to beg the question at issue.
In this paper, I shall presuppose that there is no ambiguity in our talk of
grounding: we have identified a single relation that we can theorize about. I
am indebted to previous writers on the subject who worked towards pinning
it down. Those who reject my presupposition can read my paper as arguing
that there is at least one salient relation of grounding that is only a con-
tingent connection.
The plan is as follows: In Section I, I formulate two widely accepted
principles linking grounding and necessity that I wish to contest. In
Sections II and III, I present what I take to be counterexamples to those
principles. I then consider the relationship between grounding and modality
more broadly, and ask whether grounding claims at least entail superveni-
ence claims. I formulate two supervenience-theoretic constraints on ground-
ing in Sections IV and V.
I. Candidate Linking Principles
Grounding claims come in a variety of logical forms. Those that I shall be
concerned with are of the form ‘B1;B2; . . . ground A’, where ‘A’, ‘B1’, etc.,
denote facts. So grounding claims are to be expressed by a predicate to be
flanked with a plural term on the left and a singular term on the right.
Other authors prefer to use a sentential operator, which can be read as
‘because’, to express the relevant claims. Typically, this operator is taken to
be variably polyadic. So a grounding claim may take the form ‘A because
B1;B2 . . . ’, where B1;B2 . . . is a list of sentences or propositions. Such a list is
different from a conjunction: it does not unify its members into one entity.
Correia prefers the operator on the grounds of ontological neutrality5: it
allows us to talk about grounding without being committed to facts. For my
purposes, this advantage is outweighed by an expressive limitation of the
operator. I am concerned with grounding claims that can be expressed by
philosophers, in English or in other natural languages. English is not rich
enough in its logical resources to provide, for every sentence in which the
4For some metaphysical theses, such as physicalism, contingentism is arguably the prevalent
view. Cameron, ‘Contigency of Composition’, and Parsons, ‘Conceptual Conservatism’, defend
contingentism about composition, and Miller, ‘Defending Contingentism’, about the question
whether the parts are ontologically prior to the whole.
5Correia, ‘Grounding and Truth-Functions’.
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predicate ‘grounds’ figures, an equivalent sentence using the operator. While
English can denote infinite pluralities or classes Γ of facts, it cannot express
the infinite list that corresponds to them. Moreover, some classes Γ may have
members that English is unable to express.
If we eschew talk of facts, the obvious way to achieve the effect of an
infinite list is to use a truth predicate. Instead of ‘Γ grounds α’, we would say
‘p because all members of Γ0 are true’—where Γ0 stands for a list of truth-
bearers, rather than facts. However, this comes at a cost. For consider the
popular claim that all semantic facts are grounded by non-semantic facts.
The semantic fact that ‘snow is white’ is true, say, is grounded by the fact
that snow is white, or perhaps by that fact together with the facts that
ground that ‘snow is white’ means what it does.6 The above recipe would
turn ‘For every semantic fact α, there is Γ containing only non-semantic facts
such that Γ grounds α’ into ‘For every semantic p, there is Γ containing only
non-semantic truths such that p because every member of Γ is true’. On the
face of it, that latter claim does not capture the intended claim: it does not
express a dependence of the semantic on the non-semantic. Since truth is a
paradigmatically semantic concept, ‘every member of Γ is true’ arguably
does not count as a non-semantic claim.
Admittedly, the argument just given can be challenged. On some defla-
tionary views about truth, it is not really a semantic concept. But my aim
here is not to adjudicate the question what the logical form of grounding
claim is. I merely wish to give some motivation for my choice. My hope is
that the substance of what I say carries over, mutatis mutandis, to the
operator. But I shall not discuss the operator formulations further.
Instead of enumerating the grounds, I shall often use Greek capitals to
stand for them, and say ‘Γ grounds A’ instead of B1;B2; . . . ground A. Or in
symbols: Γ < A.7 Permutation and repetition do not affect the truth value of
a grounding claim. So, in particular, if B;Γ < A is true, so are B;B;Γ < A and
Γ;B < A. I shall treat such lists as if they were classes. Since I do not think
that anything turns on this, I shall not justify that practice.
I shall use OðAÞ and OðΓÞ to express that A obtains and that all members
of A obtain, respectively. If ‘A’ does not denote anything with respect to a
possible world w, or denotes something that does not obtain in w, then OðAÞ
is false with respect to w; and likewise for OðΓÞ.
For anyone familiar with Hume’s discussion of causation, the following is
a natural reading of the claim that grounding is a necessary connection:
6See, for example, Mulligan, ‘Two Dogmas of Truthmaking’, 53, and Mulligan, ‘Truth
Predicate’, 586. It is a very interesting question what the relationship between this idea and
the preference for the minimal fixed-point in Kripke-type theories of truth is, but it is not a
question I can do justice to here.
7The symbol < is used in Fine, ‘Pure Logic of Ground’. In that paper, it stands for a sentential
connective rather than a predicate, however.
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Entailment Necessarily, if Γ < A then □ðOðΓÞ ! OðAÞÞ.
Entailment is my main target in this paper. A secondary target is another
reading of the claim that grounding is a necessary connection, this one
concerning the modal status of grounding claims themselves. To a first
approximation, this other reading says that any true grounding claim must
themselves be necessarily true: necessarily, if Γ < A, then □ðΓ < AÞ.
However, that claim is not a worthy target. For it clashes with the widely
held principle that what is grounding or grounded is the case:
Factivity Necessarily, if Γ < A, then OðΓÞ ^ OðAÞ.
Given Factivity, the necessity of true grounding claims entails that only
necessarily obtaining facts can be among their relata.
However, grounding would lose a great deal of its theoretical interest if it
could not hold among contingent relata.8 Since Factivity seems innocuous,
we should reject the necessity of grounding claims. This move vindicates a
version of contingentism about grounding already, albeit not a very exciting
one. However, there is a more controversial contingency claim in the neigh-
bourhood. The factivity of grounding is compatible with the principle that
true grounding claims hold in all possible worlds in which both the ground-
ing and the grounded facts obtain:
Internality Necessarily, if Γ < A then □ðOðΓÞ ^ OðAÞ ! Γ < AÞ.
The label for this claim is borrowed from the metaphysics of relations. In one
of its many senses, ‘internal’ applies to a relation provided that whenever it
holds among some things, it holds among them in all possible worlds in
which each of them exists.9
Entailment and Internality are logically independent claims about ground-
ing, even given Factivity. Accordingly, I will argue for their falsity sepa-
rately, in Sections II and III, respectively.
II. Against Entailment
What motivates the widespread acceptance of Entailment? Above, I sug-
gested an argument based on the premise that grounding is a species of
metaphysical determination. The argument, as formulated then, was
8It would not lose all its interest. We might still be able to use it to make fine-grained distinctions
among necessary truths, the sort of distinctions that supervenience relations are unable to
capture.
9Correia, Existential Dependence, 61, in a passage quoted earlier, endorses a principle that
entails (together with Factivity) both Internality and Entailment. Other authors do not explicitly
discuss Internality, as far as I am aware.
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unconvincing, but perhaps it can be improved. Gideon Rosen points us in an
interesting direction:
The facts that ground a given fact collectively ensure that it obtains as
a matter of metaphysical necessity. This is one respect in which the
grounding relation, which is a relation of metaphysical determination,
differs from causal and other merely nomic forms of determination.
There is a difference between the materialist who holds that facts about
phenomenal consciousness are grounded in (and hence necessitated by)
the neurophysiological facts directly, and the dualist who think that
facts about the brain cause or generate conscious states according to
contingent causal laws.10
Rosen is not claiming to be offering an argument for Entailment in this
passage. Rather, he is illustrating the claim. Nonetheless, we can ask whether
he provides the ingredients for an argument.
Materialism, or physicalism, holds that phenomenal facts—facts about
conscious experience—are grounded by neurophysiological facts. Some
versions of dualism hold that phenomenal facts are caused or generated
by neurophysiological facts according to contingent laws. Since physical-
ism is incompatible with any version of dualism, grounding is different
from the pertinent relations of causation and generation. So far, this
argument is unexceptionable. But can its conclusion be used to establish
Entailment? We need to account for the difference between grounding on
one hand and causation and generation on the other. One way to do this
would be to accept Entailment and reject the corresponding claims about
causation and generation. But there may well be other ways.11 For exam-
ple, one could argue that grounding is synchronic, while causation and
generation are diachronic. Moreover, there might be differences in their
modal status even if Entailment and its analogue for causation both fail—a
variant of Entailment restricted to worlds without alien natural properties
may be true for grounding but not for causation.12 If that is
correct, it seems to be enough to account for the difference between these
views.13
It appears, then, that Rosen’s observation about the difference between
physicalism and dualism cannot be parlayed into an argument for Entailment.
I shall not examine further why particular authors accept the latter. Before
proceeding tomakemy case against it, I would like point out that contingentists
10Rosen, ‘Metaphysical Dependence’, 118.
11Note that Rosen claims otherwise; as I said, the argument I am criticizing is not Rosen’s.
12Lewis, ‘New Work for a Theory’.
13For a more thorough discussion of whether the contingentist can account for the difference, see
Skiles, ‘Getting Grounded’.
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about grounding can draw encouragement from the history of the debate on
causation. After all, an analogue of Entailment for causation used to be widely
accepted, but is now generally recognized to be false: the principle that if
some facts Γ cause A, then their joint obtaining necessitates A.14 Early theorists
of causation tended do characterize causation as a necessary connection, but
subsequent theorists managed to say something informative about it even after
rejecting that supposedly characteristic feature.
In the rest of this section, I shall identify potential counterexamples to
Entailment—classes of facts that plausibly ground other facts without
strictly implying them.
II.i. Physical facts and phenomenal facts
Consider Φ@, the class of all actually obtaining physical facts. Among other
things,Φ@ includes facts about all particle positions and velocities, and all field
values at all spacetime points. The success of physical sciences in providing
reductive explanations of various phenomena gives us some reason to think
that physicalism is true, and hence also suggests that every non-physical fact is
grounded by some (proper or improper) subclass of Φ@. In particular, phe-
nomenal facts—such asRed, the fact that I am having a red experience—are so
grounded, if physicalism is true. The link between physicalism and grounding
claims exploited here is implicit in the passage by Rosen quoted earlier: he
takes it to be a commitment of physicalism that neurophysiological facts—here
included among the physical facts—ground phenomenal facts. Presumably,
then, there is some Φ  Φ@ such that the antecedent of the instance of
Entailment produced by Φ and Red is true: Φ grounds Red. What about the
consequent, the claim thatOðΦÞ strictly impliesO(Red)? Plausibly, it is possible
that all facts in Φ obtain but Red does not. After all, such a combination of
facts is conceivable. It thus appears possible, and we have no particular reason
to think that the appearance of possibility is misleading in this case.
This argument against Entailment can be formalized using the following
three premises:
(1) Possibly, physicalism is true and Red obtains as a non-fundamental
fact.
(2) Necessarily, there are no physical facts Γ such that □ðOðΓÞ ! O(Red )).
(3) Necessarily, if physicalism is true, then for every non-fundamental fact
A there are physical facts Γ such that Γ < A.
From these premises, it follows (even in a very weak modal logic) that it is
not necessary that for all Γ, if Γ < Red then □ðOðΓÞ ! O(Red )), and hence
that Entailment has a false instance.
14Steven Nadler writes that ‘[o]ne of the central ingredients of the philosophical analysis of
causation traditionally has been necessity. A causal relation is a necessary relation. . . . If a is the
cause of b, then a, in some sense, necessitates b’. (Nadler, ‘Malebranche on Causation’, 113).
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This argument against Entailment can be attacked in different ways. In the
following, I shall defend it against four objections, the most pressing one—
which may well have occurred to the reader—last.
The objection from dualism attacks premise (1). If physicalism is incompa-
tible with the existence of phenomenal consciousness, it is not possible that
the former is true and Red obtains, and there is no counterexample to
Entailment. It thus seems that dualists have not been given any reason to
reject Entailment.
The objection is correct as far as it goes. However, in the present dialectic,
it does not go very far. Typically, theories of grounding are intended to be
neutral on a wide range of metaphysical claims. They cannot be neutral
throughout; after all, grounding is itself a topic in metaphysics. Whatever the
exact extent of the required neutrality, it is clear that the truth or falsity of
physicalism ought not to be settled by a theory of grounding. But my
argument might still saddle proponents of Entailment with a commitment
to the falsity of physicalism, for all the objection from dualism says.
Therefore, the objection does little to ease the pressure on Entailment.
The objection from necessitarianism attacks premise (2). The counter-
example to Entailment relies on the truth of a controversial possibility
claim: that it is possible that Φ@ and :Red are both true. In support of
that possibility claim, I gestured at conceivability, and the appearance of
possibility. Notoriously, it is hard to substantiate these claims, and flesh out
a modal epistemology to back up one’s modal claim. Some philosophers are
ready to reject our pre-theoretical possibility judgements. They may hold, for
example, that metaphysical possibility is just logical compatibility with the
laws of nature. Necessitarians of that stripe will be unimpressed by the
considerations I adduced.
As with the objection from dualism, I dispute the dialectical significance of
the point. I am addressing the question how grounding relates to modality.
In doing that, I am assuming certain views about modality that I take to be
fairly orthodox, and investigate how they relate to grounding, which is less
well explored. It is clear that assuming necessitarianism makes Entailment a
much weaker, more easily defensible claim. To see this, suppose that the
most extreme version of necessitarianism, namely fatalism, is true, such that
every truth is necessary. Then Factivity will already guarantee the truth of
Entailment. But as it is normally introduced, Entailment is not supposed to
be hostage to non-standard views about possibility.
The objection from physicalist commitments attacks premise (3). Above, I
took evidence for physicalism to be ipso facto evidence for the thesis that all
facts are grounded by some class of actual physical facts. This may be
questioned: perhaps physicalism only requires that a given fact is grounded
by some physical facts, or by Φ@ plus a totality fact.
To a first approximation, a totality fact is a fact expressed by a ‘that’s all’-
clause. Totality facts have been invoked as truthmakers for general or
8 Stephan Leuenberger
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universal facts, which are expressed by universal quantifications. In that
context, a totality fact is one that rules out the existence of any individuals
beyond those in a certain specified class. In the present context, a totality
fact would be one that rules out that there are any fundamental facts beyond
those in Φ@.
According to this objection, my argument above failed to motivate the
claim that some class of physical facts grounds Red by itself.
In response, I would like to pose a dilemma for the objector’s appeal to
totality facts. As with properties, we can distinguish between sparse and
abundant facts. Sparse facts are natural as opposed to disjunctive, relatively
fundamental as opposed to derivative.
For the first horn of the dilemma, suppose that totality facts are sparse,
and assume with the objector that Φ@ plus the totality fact grounds Red but
Φ@ alone does not. It then follows that the totality fact is not in Φ@ and is
thus not a physical fact. Surely, grounding satisfies the following weak
version of transitivity: if Γ < A, and A;Γ < B, then Γ < B.15 Letting A, B,
and Γ be the totality fact, Red, and Φ@, respectively, it follows that Φ@ does
not ground the totality fact. Hence there is a sparse non-physical fact that is
not grounded by Φ@. This, I submit, is incompatible with physicalism. While
the view may or may not require that every abundant fact is grounded by the
physical facts, it surely requires that every sparse fact is so grounded.
On the second horn of the dilemma, suppose that totality facts are merely
abundant. Then it is extremely implausible that they play an irreducible role
in grounding claims. That is, if a fact is grounded at all, is grounded by a
class that only includes sparse facts. Merely abundant facts do not essentially
feature among the grounds of a given fact. To have a abundant facts play an
ineliminable grounding role is to put the cart before the horse.
As we have seen, the objector claims that Φ@ together with the totality fact
grounds Red but Φ@ alone does not. By the principle just motivated, Red is
also grounded by a class that consists exclusively of sparse facts. Since Φ@
includes all physical facts, some sparse facts are not physical facts. Again, I
submit that this is incompatible with physicalism. I thus conclude that the
physicalist ought not to allow that Φ@ plus a totality fact grounds something
that is not grounded by any subclass of Φ@ alone.
Last but not least, the objection from premise incompatibility attacks the
conjunction of premises (1) and (2). This objection is the most pressing one.
If :ðOðΦ@Þ ! O(Red )) is possible, then there is a possible world that is a
physical duplicate of ours in which my doppelgänger does not have a red
experience, and is thus a zombie or at least a partial zombie—he exhibits a
15According to the strong transitivity principle for grounding (explicitly asserted by Rosen,
‘Metaphyscial Dependence’, and a consequence of the system in Fine, ‘Pure Logic of
Ground’), Γ;Δ < A whenever B;Δ < A and Γ < B. The weak version I am using follows by
setting Γ ¼ Δ.
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kind of superblindsight. But, the objection goes, if such creatures are possi-
ble, then physicalism is false, and it is not the case that phenomenal facts are
grounded by physical ones. For physicalism stands and falls with the impos-
sibility of zombies, of the full or the partial variety. After all, the so-called
‘Zombie Argument’ uses exactly such possibility claims to argue against
physicalism.
The hypothetical objector does not claim to know the falsity of either
premise (1) or premise (2). Rather, she claims to know that the two premises
are incompatible.
In response, I question the objector’s claim about the modal commitments
of physicalism. Admittedly, the incompatibility of physicalism with the
possibility of zombies is widely accepted. However, we need to heed a
distinction that is often overlooked. In one sense, a zombie world is a
physical duplicate of the actual world in which some actual phenomenal
facts do not hold. In another sense, a zombie world needs to satisfy a further
condition in addition to those just mentioned: it is a purely materialistic
world, one in which there is nothing over and above the physical facts.16 I
claim that the possibility of zombie worlds in the first sense is compatible
with physicalism, and that the possibility of zombie worlds in the second
sense is not needed for my putative counterexample to Entailment. The
second claim is obvious: in describing the relevant possibility claim, I did
not need to mention that there is nothing over and above the physical. The
first claim, however, needs more argument.
Physicalism is often introduced with a creation metaphor: it is true if God
was finished creating the world once He had put all the physical facts in
place. Consider a variant of that metaphor. In the actual world, God had put
all the physical facts in place by the end of day seven. This was enough to
make it the case that Red obtains. God henceforth left the world alone. In
world wb, God on day eight ensured that in the region occupied by my brain,
a non-physical fundamental property, to be called ‘chromaplasm’, is instan-
tied. Chromaplasm makes visual phenomenology disappear. In wb, I do not
have a red experience, i.e. Red does not hold. The presence of chromaplasm
is a blocker of Red in wb.
17
Clearly, wb is not materialistic, because of the presence of chromaplasm.
The question, then, is whether in this scenario, there is indeed a subclass of
Φ@ that grounds Red in the actual world. Pace Hawthorne,
18 it seems to me
that it is.19 The mere possibility of wb ought to be compatible with physic-
alism. What God could have done after day seven ought not to bear on the
16Notoriously, the ‘nothing over and above’ condition is hard to spell out without appeal to
grounding or a cognate notion. But this difficulty need not concern us here.
17Hawthorne, ‘Blocking Definitions’, introduces the idea of such blockers.
18Hawthrone, ‘Blocking Definitions’.
19I address Hawthorne’s argument in Leuenberger, ‘Ceteris Absentibus Physicalism’, where the
compatibility of physicalism with the possibility of blockers is defended in more detail.
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question whether our world—where, by hypothesis, He stopped after day
seven—is physicalistic. Since in the actual world, God only created physical
facts and then retired, physicalism is true. All the actual fundamental facts
are physical, after all, and that seems to be sufficient condition for the truth
of physicalism. Hence Red is grounded by some class of physical facts.20
It seems to me that none of these objections to my argument are convin-
cing. To conclude the discussion, I would like to emphasize that my conclu-
sion is not merely that Entailment fails for some relation in the grounding
family. That would hardly be news. For example, Fine introduces the notion
of natural grounding,21 for which Entailment fails. But ‘grounding’, in my
usage, does not refer to natural grounding. In the above argument, it was
important for me to make the case that the actual world of that scenario was
materialistic. If I had been concerned with natural grounding, I would not
have bothered. For I take it that even dualism is compatible with the claim
that every non-physical fact is naturally grounded by some physical facts.
Consider a scenario where both mental and physical properties are meta-
physically fundamental, and where there are fundamental psycho-physical
laws that determine the distribution of mental properties as a function of the
distribution of the physical ones. (Chalmers is sympathetic to a view of that
kind.)22 Then any mental facts will presumably be naturally grounded by the
physical facts. But I would certainly deny that the former are grounded—
genuinely grounded, grounded simpliciter—by the latter.
II.ii. Grounding dispositions
Admittedly, not all the assumptions relied on in constructing my counter-
example are uncontroversial. It will thus strengthen my case against
Entailment if I can identify another falsifying instance. While still contro-
versial, the assumptions required will be different. Even though the two
counterexamples are structurally similar, they may convince different
readers.
Rosen lists the following as a candidate grounding claims:
The dispositions of a thing are always grounded in its categorical
features . . . . A glass is fragile in virtue of the arrangement of the
molecules that make it up, perhaps together with the laws of chemistry
and physics.23
20The physicalist has far greater resources to resist arguments for the conceivability of a zombie
world in the second sense—a purely materialistic world without consciousness—than those for
the conceivability of a zombie world in the first sense. However, a detailed consideration of
conceivability arguments is beyond the scope of this article.
21Fine, ‘Guide to Ground’, 38–9.
22Chalmers, The Conscious Mind.
23Rosen, ‘Metaphysical Dependence’, 110.
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Suppose that such a ‘categoricalist’ view of dispositions is right. Let g be a
fragile glass, and Db;sg the fact that g is disposed to break when struck.
Categoricalism requires that Db;sg has some categorical basis KðDb;sgÞ. We
can think of that basis as consisting of facts. KðDb;sgÞ will be a subclass of
the class Kg of all instantiations of categorical properties by parts of g. More
precisely, if x is a part of g and F any categorical property, then either the
fact that x has F or the fact that x lacks F is in Kg, and likewise for
categorical relations.24 According to categoricalism, KðDb;sgÞ grounds Db;sg.
Suppose further that the laws of nature involving the actual categorical
properties are contingent: in some other possible worlds, KðDb;sgÞ is
nomically related to different causal powers. Then some possible duplicate
of the glass does not have the disposition. If the categorical basis grounds
the disposition by itself, then this constitutes a counterexample to
Entailment.
However, the grounding claim in question may not be plausible anyway. It
is much more plausible that it is together with certain laws of nature that
KðDb;sgÞ grounds the disposition—a variant that Rosen mentions as well.
But that claim is vulnerable to a modified counterexample. Suppose that in
world w5, there is a fifth fundamental force, associated with an alien prop-
erty whose bearers attract each other. While the corresponding law of w5 is
not a law of the actual world, all actual laws are also laws in w5—such as the
laws linking mass to the gravitational force, electric charge to the electro-
magnetic forces, colour charge to the strong nuclear force, as well as the laws
relating forces to motion. In w5, the glass g is in many respects just like it is
in the actual world. Its parts are exactly the same with respects to the bearers
of actual fundamental forces. However, the parts instantiate the alien prop-
erty in w5, in such a way that it would not break if struck. So it seems that
KðDb;sgÞ and Db;sg form another counterexample to Entailment.
Before considering objections, I shall set out the argument in three pre-
mises again.
(1′) Possibly, categoricalism is true and Db;sg obtains.
(2′) Necessarily, there are no categorical facts Γ such that □ðOðΓÞ !
OðDb;sgÞÞ.
(3′) Necessarily, if categoricalism is true, then for every dispositional fact
A there are categorical facts Γ such that Γ < A.
This argument has a very similar structure to the one in the last section.
Dialectically, it has different strengths and weaknesses, however. As far as I
24I am here assuming the widely held view that dispositions are intrinsic (see Lewis, ‘Finkish
Dispositions’, 147–8, for example). McKitrick, ‘Case for Extrinsic’, argues that some disposi-
tions are extrinsic, in the sense of differing among nomic duplicates. On such a view, dispositions
are presumably not grounded by intrinsic facts alone. Still, as long as they have a (partly
extrinsic) basis, I could run a modified version of my argument.
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am aware, there is no body of literature asserting the incompatibility of (1′)
and (2′), so an analogue to the objection from incompatible premises is not
particularly threatening. On the other hand, the commitments of categoric-
alism are less easy to pin down than the commitments of physicalism, so the
present argument is more vulnerable in that respect.
The objection from dispositionalism attacks premise (1′). The response,
predictably, is similar as before: whether or not categoricalism about dis-
positions is true, it ought to be compatible with a theory of grounding.
The objection from masking attacks premise (2′). This objection starts from
the well-known observation that an object may be disposed to break if struck
even though it is not the case that it would break if it were struck. For the
disposition may be finkish—prone to disappearing when the stimulus is
present—or masked. Since in world w5, striking does not in any way change
the basis of the disposition, the falsity of the counterfactual cannot be due to
finkishness. According to the objection, however, g is still disposed to break
if struck in w5, except that that disposition is masked by the presence of the
fifth fundamental force, in the way that the fragility of a vase may be masked
by the presence of bubble wrap.
One way to resist this objection would be to argue that masks must be
extrinsic to the bearer of the disposition. However, that claim has recently
come under sustained pressure.25 So it is more promising to allow that some
masks may be intrinsic, while insisting that the particular case I described is
not one of them. If we ascribed to g in w5 the disposition to break if struck,
then by analogy, we would need to ascribe to actual objects many disposi-
tions that they do not have. Let w3 a world in which some region duplicates
the region occupied by my desk with respect to three fundamental forces, but
not with respect to the strong interaction. Then the object occupying that
region—whether it counts as a desk or not—is disposed to disintegrate if
touched—or indeed, to disintegrate upon any stimulus whatsoever. After all,
it is the strong interaction that keeps the protons in the atomic nuclei
together, despite their electric repulsion. By reasoning analogous to the one
deployed in the objection from masking, we would have to accept that my
desk also has the disposition to disintegrate if touched—except that that
disposition is masked by the presence of the strong interaction. But clearly,
my desk is not disposed to disintegrate if touched, so something must be
wrong with the reasoning.
It is difficult to characterize the distinction between cases where an object
lacks a disposition and cases where that disposition is masked. One con-
straint, however, is that masking cases cannot be normal. That is, it cannot
be the case that normally, if x is disposed to give response r to stimulus s,
then that disposition is masked. As is familiar from other contexts, the
notion of normalcy need not be cashed out in statistical terms. (According
25For example in Clarke, ‘Opposing Powers’.
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to the promising proposal of Bird,26 normal interferers—which do not
qualify as masks—are those that originate in a design feature or a natural
function.) But however it is cashed out exactly, normalcy is a world-relative
matter. The fact that it is not normal for the fifth force to operate in this
world does not prevent its operation from being normal in w5. We can easily
fill out the description of that world in such a way that the presence of that
force is normal. So the objection from masking fails.
The objection from categoricalist commitments attacks premise (3′).
According to this objection, a categoricalist can adopt a more liberal under-
standing of categorical facts—they need not belong to Kg as I specified it. In
particular, she can include facts involving categorical properties that do not
exist in the actual world. Let F5 be the categorical property with which the
fifth force of w5 is associated. Then the categorical facts also include, for
each part x of g, the fact that x does not have F5. Since in w5, some parts of g
do have F5, w5 is not a world where the categorical grounds for Db;sg obtain.
Hence the example is consistent with a strict implication between those
grounds and the obtaining of the disposition.
I have two responses to this objection. The first is to dispute that the
appeal to negative facts about F5 is compatible with the spirit of categor-
icalism. Typically, categoricalists look with suspicion on fundamental facts
that involve, in some sense, non-actual worlds, or brute counterfactuals.
They hold that facts about non-actual worlds or about what would happen
if things were different do not qualify as explainers—only this-worldly facts
do. But the fact that g, or one of its parts, does not have F5 does not appear
to be a this-worldly fact in the relevant sense. After all, one of its constituents
is the alien property F5.
The second response concedes, for the sake of the argument, that non-
instantiations of alien properties may qualify as categorical grounds, but
urges that categoricalism, if true, is itself only contingent. This assumption,
while controversial, does not beg any questions against Entailment: catego-
rical facts may strictly imply dispositional facts even though the latter can
obtain in the absence of the former. If categoricalism is only contingent, then
the objector is not entitled to assume that it holds in w5, and that the fifth
force is associated with a categorical property. It may be a fundamental
dispositional property of the parts of g to be such as to satisfy a cluster of
counterfactuals—roughly, to move in a certain way given a certain regime of
other forces.27 Let F 05 be that property. Then clearly, negative facts about F
0
5
are not among the categorical facts in the world. For one of their constitu-
ents is a property that is not only non-actual, but also non-categorical.
26Bird, ‘Can Dispositions Have Intrinsic Finks and Antidotes?’.
27According to dispositional essentialism, actual fundamental properties are dispositional. For a
development and defence of that view, see Bird, Nature’s Metaphysics. For discussion of the
possibility of such purely modal properties, see Manley, ‘Dispositionality’.
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Hence w5 is a world where all the actual categorical facts about g obtain, and
the counterexample stands.
A variant of this second response is also effective against the suggestion
that the categoricalist can appeal to certain quantified negative facts, such as
the fact T4 that there are no fundamental properties except F1, F2, F3, and
F4. If there are possible non-categorical properties, then this fact is not itself
a categorical fact. This follows from a plausible constraint: if the proposition
that a given fact A obtains is not a proposition about the categorical subject-
matter, then A is not a categorical fact. Following David Lewis,28 I am
modelling subject-matters as partitions of the class of possible worlds, and
take a proposition to be about a subject-matter just in case its truth value is a
function of what cell the actual world belongs to. In the case of the catego-
rical subject-matter, the cells of the partition are maximal classes of worlds
that are duplicates of each other in all categorical respects. The truth value of
the proposition that T4 obtains can vary within such a cell: it may be true in
the actual world and false in a categorical duplicate with fundamental
dispositional properties. So T4 is not a categorical fact, and cannot be
indispensable in grounding dispositional fact, if catgoricalism is true.
Clearly, these counterexamples exhibit a general pattern: Entailment fails
because in some possible worlds—blocker worlds—there are extra funda-
mental facts whose obtaining ensures the non-obtaining of certain facts that,
in the actual world, are grounded in other facts.
There are quite a few more potential cases of grounding without necessita-
tion. One could argue that facts involving intrinsic properties ground facts
involving maximal properties—properties such as being a rock that cannot
be had by any proper part of one of its bearers—even though they do not
strictly imply them.29 Drawing on Dancy,30 one could argue that some
deontic facts fail to be strictly implied by their grounds.
Some of these further examples might be more convincing for some read-
ers than those that I have chosen. However, I take it that the strategy for
how to undermine Entailment has been sufficiently illustrated, and I will
now move on to consider Internality.
III. Against Internality
Internality asserts that grounding facts are contingent only on the obtaining
of the relata:
Internality Necessarily, if Γ < A then □ðOðΓÞ ^ OðAÞ ! Γ < AÞ.
28Lewis, ‘Relevant Implication’.
29Sider, ‘Maximality and Intrinsic’.
30Dancy, Ethics without Principles.
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As I noted in Section I, Internality is logically independent from Entailment.
For this reason, the arguments of the previous section do not establish the
falsity of Internality. However, my proposed counterexamples to Entailment
are also couterexamples to Internality—or so I shall argue.
Suppose again physicalism is true in the actual world, such that some class
of physical facts Φ grounds Red. Let the world wbb be like wb in so far as it is
a physical duplicate of the actual world in which the region corresponding to
my brain is suffused with chromaplasm. But unlike in wb, that same region is
further suffused with antiplasm—a non-physical fundamental property that
works as an antidote to chromaplasm. Since the presence of that property
cancels out the effect of the blocker, Red does hold in wbb. But intuitively,
Red is not grounded by Φ alone in wbb: the fact that the blocker-blocker
antiplasm is instantiated plays a crucial role in an account of how Red is
grounded in that world. If that intuitive verdict is right, Φ and Red yield a
false instance of Internality: Φ grounds Red, but it is possible that Φ does not
ground Red even though they both hold.
The argument that the second counterexample to Entailment above also
produces a counterexample to Internality proceeds in a similar way. In the
actual world, KðDb;sgÞ grounds the fact that the glass g is disposed to break.
In w5, as we saw, some property associated with a fifth fundamental force
stabilizes the glass. In w6, all the fundamental facts of w5 hold, but in
addition, there is an alien property G associated with a sixth fundamental
force. The distribution of that force just cancels out the fifth fundamental
force present in w5 but not @. Hence g is disposed to break in w6. But
intuitively, facts about the distribution of G play an ineliminable role in an
account of how g’s disposition is grounded in w6. Since KðDb;sgÞ and the
dispositional fact obtain in both @ and w6, but stand in the relation of
grounding only in @, they provide a counterexample to Internality.
The two counterexamples follow the same pattern: Internality fails
because there is a possible world—a blocker-blocker world—where the
grounds, the grounded fact, a blocker as well as a blocker-blocker obtains.
As with Entailment, we could produce further potential counterexamples
using this pattern.
IV. Supervenience of Grounding
So far, my aim has been negative: to show that certain putative principles
linking grounding and modality fail. This may help to fuel a certain kind of
scepticism about metaphysicians’ talk of grounding. Some philosophers feel
that theorists of grounding have not done enough to pin down one concept,
and hence failed to give legitimacy to such talk. The rejection of widely
accepted modal constraints on grounding may play into their hands.
Friends of grounding may thus be interested in identifying modal con-
straints on grounding that are compatible with examples of the kind I
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presented. In the remainder of the paper, I try to formulate principles that
are in the spirit of Internality and Entailment, and yet do not fall foul of the
possibility of blockers and blocker-blockers. The proposed principles do not
directly involve the notion of necessity, but rather the notion of superveni-
ence. They thus assert a link between grounding and modality broadly
construed.
I shall start by formulating a weaker supervenience-theoretic variant of
Internality. In the next section, I shall then attempt to do the same for
Entailment.
Internality is equivalent to a supervenience claim: any pair of worlds that
are indiscernible with respect to the obtaining of Γ and A are indiscernible
also with respect to whether Γ grounds A.31 Another, weaker supervenience
claim results from expanding the supervenience base to include all facts, and
not just those in Γ and A. To make this precise, say that w and w0 are
factually indiscernible just in case every fact obtains in w iff it obtains in w0.
We then have:
Supervenience of Grounding If w and w0 are factually indiscernible, then Γ
grounds A in w iff Γ grounds A in w0.
This thesis seems to capture at least part of the intuition that motivated
Internality: that grounding links are not external relations among facts.
When God had created all the facts, He was done creating the world. He
did not have to add grounding links among the facts. Grounding relations
follow from the identity of those facts, as it were.32
Supervenience of Grounding is compatible with the counterexamples to
Internality. The world wbb where Φ does not ground Red differs from the
actual world in what facts obtain—chromaplasm is instantiated in wbb but
not in the actual world, for example.
It might be thought to be trivially true that grounding supervenes on
what facts obtain. For suppose that Γ grounds A in w but not in w0. Then
it would seem that there is a fact, namely, that Γ grounds A, that obtains
in w but not in w0. Hence the two worlds are factually discernible.
However, in my usage, not every truth corresponds to a fact. Facts are
relata of the grounding relation, but instances of that relation do not in
turn constitute facts—there is no fact that Γ grounds A, even if Γ does
ground A.
The non-triviality of the above supervenience is thus hostage to a certain
conception of facts. Fortunately, though, this concerns only its letter, not its
31The equivalence holds under the assumption that all worlds are accessible to each other.
32Fine, ‘Varieties of Necessity’, 244–5, argues that an analogous supervenience principle for
natural necessity fails. Presumably, the associated relation of natural grounding also fails to
supervene. If so, Supervenience of Grounding articulates another respect in which grounding, on
my conception, is different from natural grounding as construed by Fine.
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spirit. If there are facts about grounding, then the idea behind Supervenience
of Grounding needs to be expressed differently. A natural approach would
be to take the supervenience base to consist of facts that do not involve
grounding—‘non-aetiological facts’, as we might call them. Depending on
the details of the theory, these might be the facts which do not have the
relation of grounding among their constituents.
So Supervenience of Grounding is not trivial. Still, I expect it to be an
uncontroversial constraint on grounding. It is hard to make sense of two
worlds with exactly the same facts obtaining in them, but differing in the
explanatory connections between those facts.
V. Supervenience of the Grounded on its Grounds
It remains for us to capture the idea that the grounded supervenes on its
ground. One way to do is invokes the idea of fundamentality. Say that A is
fundamental in world w iff A obtains in w, and there is no Γ that grounds A
in w. Say that w and w0 are fundamentally indiscernible iff every A that is
fundamental in w is fundamental in w0, and vice versa. Then the following
has some plausibility:
Supervenience on Fundamentals If w and w0 are fundamentally indiscernible,
they are factually indiscernible.
That is, the bottom of the grounding hierarchy fixes all the facts above it.
Thanks to Supervenience of Grounding, it will also follow that if the funda-
mental facts are the same in two worlds, exactly the same grounding claims
will be true in both worlds.
To see what kind of possibility is ruled out by Supervenience on
Fundamentals, suppose that physicalism is true, and that all facts are
grounded by the fundamental physical facts. In particular, my having a red
experience is grounded by that class. If Supervenience on Fundamentals
holds, there is no possible world whose fundamental facts are exactly the
same as in the actual world, but in which those facts ground a fact incom-
patible with my having a red experience—say my having a green experience.
Surely, this is a scenario that we want to rule out.
Note that Supervenience on Fundamentals is compatible with my counter-
examples to Entailment. The actual world and wb are not fundamentally
indiscernible, since there are fundamental facts involving chromaplasm in wb
that do not obtain in the actual world.
However, Supervenience on Fundamentals rules out too much in another
respect. It is incompatible with the possibility of factually discernible worlds
all of whose facts are ‘gunky’. In mereology, a gunky object is one all whose
parts have proper parts. In the theory of grounding, a fact is gunky if it is not
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fundamental, and no fact that belongs to any of its grounds is fundamental
either.33 There are several models for such facts. If objects are gunky and
facts about wholes are determined by facts about their proper parts, then
facts about objects will be gunky. On a quasi-Leibnizian view, every prop-
erty is conjunctively analysable, and so facts involving those properties will
presumably be gunky.
If all facts in a world are gunky, then none are fundamental. Any two
worlds with only gunky facts are thus vacuously fundamentally indiscernible,
by the definition above.
But a general theory of grounding ought not to rule out the possibility of
gunky facts.34 So Supervenience on Fundamentals needs to be modified to
be compatible with that possibility. The idea to be retained is that the upper
parts of the grounding chains supervene on the lower parts, whether the
lower parts are fundamental or not. I propose to cash this out by another
supervenience claim. Schematically, it reads as follows:
Supervenience on Grounds Any two possible worlds that are ground-indis-
cernible are factually indiscernible.
It remains to define a notion of ground-indiscernibility. The informal desi-
derata for the definition are that the resulting instance of Supervenience on
Grounds is plausible, and that it captures the idea that the grounded depends
on the grounds.
We can lay down some formal desiderata for the relation to be defined, and
the instance of Supervenience on Grounds that it yields. First, ground-indis-
cernibility ought to be entailed by factual indiscernibility together with
Supervenience of Grounding. After all, other kinds of differences between
worlds, if there be such, are not relevant in this context. Second, ground-
indiscernibility ought to be an equivalence relation. For given Supervenience
of Grounding and the first desideratum, Supervenience on Grounds entails
that worlds are ground-indiscernible if and only if they are factually indis-
cernible. Since factual indiscernibility is an equivalence relation, ground-indis-
cernibility must be one as well. Third, ground-indiscernibility ought to entail
fundamental indiscernibility, but not vice versa, such that Supervenience on
Grounds turns out to be logically weaker than Supervenience on
Fundamentals. In particular, it ought to allow that two worlds with only
gunky facts are factually indiscernible. Fourth, Supervenience on Grounds
ought to be a consequence of Entailment, unlike Supervenience on
Fundamentals. My interest here is in finding a plausible fall-back position
from Entailment, and I do not wish to smuggle in constraints that do not
33This characterization is adequate only if, as is standard, a strong transitivity principle for
grounding is assumed.
34On this point, I am in agreement with Rosen, ‘Metaphysical Dependence’, 116. For a dissent-
ing view, see Schaffer, ‘Monism’.
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follow from the latter claim. The satisfaction of each of these four formal
desiderata should be demonstrable from the definition alone, without any
substantive assumptions about the space of possible worlds or facts.
The formal desiderata are all satisfied by the relation of factual indiscern-
ibility. But plugging in this relation into Supervenience on Grounds produces
a merely trivial claim, which is unable the capture the idea of dependence.
I shall now define a relation of ground-indiscernibility that satisfies both
the informal and the formal desiderata. The intuitive idea is this. Suppose we
pick a fact A in w, then one of its grounds in w, then a ground of that latter
fact, and so on indefinitely. If whatever our choices, we always either stop
with a fundamental fact that also obtains in w0, or else eventually only pick
facts that also obtain in w0, then the ultimate grounds, as it were, of A in w
are all present in w0. If this holds for all facts of w, and conversely for all facts
of w0, then w and w0 are ground-indiscernible.
To make these ideas precise, I shall make use of the concept of a transfi-
nite sequence.
I shall assume, in the following, that all descending grounding chains are
set-sized. That is, even though I allow descending grounding chains that are
infinitely long, I do not allow ones that are proper class long. Furthermore, I
shall assume that even though there may be proper class many facts, the
facts that belong to some ground of a given fact A form a set.35
Let f be a sequence of facts, and Γ a class of facts. We say that Γ is an
s-ground of f in world w iff there is a non-empty final segment f 0 of f such
that Γ < B for all B 2 f 0. This condition simplifies in the case in which f has a
last element: Γ is an s-ground of f just in case Γ grounds that last element.
For a fact A of w, an A-sequence in w is a function f with f ð0Þ ¼ A, and
such that f ðαÞ belongs to some s-ground of f jα whenever f is defined for an
ordinal α > 0. Here, f jα is the restriction of f to the domain α, that is, the
sequence consisting of all the predecessors of α in f. Clearly, there are A-
sequences for every fact A, for example the sequence hAi defined only for the
ordinal 0.
An A-sequence f is maximal in w iff there is no A-sequence f 0 of which it is
a proper initial segment. That is, the maximal A-sequences are those that
that are not s-grounded. It can be shown that there are maximal A-sequences
for every fact A.36
35On the supposition that there are worlds with descending grounding chains of proper class
length, it is very plausible that there are factually indiscernible worlds that are ground-indis-
cernible according to the definition I am about to give. More work would be required to
formulate a supervenience constraint on grounding that accommodates infinite descent of proper
class length.
36Sketch of proof: Given our assumptions, the A-sequences form a set SAw, which is partially
ordered by the relation that holds between f and g if f is an initial segment of g. Let C be a chain
in that partial order. Then it can be verified that
S
C is a supremum for C in SAw. By Zorn’s
Lemma, it follows that SAw has a maximal element.
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The sequences just defined can now be used to define ground-indiscernibility.
A w-sequence is an A-sequence in w, for some A. For an ordinal β, a
w-sequence f is β-convergent in w0 iff f 0 with f 0ðγÞ ¼df f ðβ þ γÞ is a maximal
f ðβÞ-sequence in w0. Finally, we can complete the definition: w and w0 are
ground-indiscernible iff every maximal w-sequence is β-convergent in w0, for
some ordinal β, and every maximal w0-sequence is β0-convergent in w, for some
ordinal β0.
So-defined, ground-indiscernibility and Supervenience on Grounds satisfy all
four formal desiderata. Pertinent proofs are to be found in the Appendix.
Importantly, Supervenience on Grounds is metaphysically plausible,
although certainly non-trivial. It captures, at least partially, the defensible
core of the idea that there is a necessary connection between grounds and
what they ground.
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Appendix: The formal desiderata
Proposition 1. Given Supervenience of Grounding, factually indiscernible worlds are
ground-indiscernible.
Proof. Suppose that w and w0 are factually indiscernible. Let f be any maximal w-
sequence. Since w and w0 are factually indiscernible, f ð0Þ obtains in w0. By
Supervenience of Grounding, Γ < A in w iff Γ < A in w0. Using this, it is easy to
verify that f satisfies the conditions on a maximal f ð0Þ-sequence in w0. Since
f ðγÞ ¼ f ð0þ γÞ, f is 0-convergent in w0. Since f was chosen arbitrarily, we conclude
that every maximal w-sequence is 0-convergent in w0, and vice versa, and hence that w
and w0 are ground-indiscernible. ■
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Proposition 2. Ground-indiscernibility is an equivalence relation.
Proof. The symmetry of ground-indiscernibility follows immediately from its defini-
tion. Reflexivity holds because every w-sequence is 0-convergent in w. For transitiv-
ity, suppose that w and w0, and w0 and w00, are ground-indiscernible, respectively.
Consider any maximal w-sequence f. Since w and w0 are ground-indiscernible, there is
some β such that f is β-convergent in w0. That is, f 0 defined by f 0ðγÞ ¼ f ðβ þ γÞ is a
maximal f ðβÞ-sequence in w0. Since w and w0 are ground-indiscernible, there is some
β0 such that f 0 is β0-convergent in w00. That is, f 00 defined by f 00ðγÞ ¼ f 0ðβ0 þ γÞ is an
f ðβ0Þ-sequence in w00. By the associativity of ordinal addition,
f 00ðγÞ ¼ f 0ðβ0 þ γÞ ¼ f ðβ þ ðβ0 þ γÞÞ ¼ f ððβ þ β0Þ þ γÞ. So f is β þ β0-convergent in w00.
Since f was chosen arbitrarily, every w-sequence is γ-convergent in w00, for some γ. The
same argument could be given with the roles of w00 and w reversed. So w and w00 are
ground-indiscernible, establishing transitivity. ■
Proposition 3. Supervenience on Fundamentals is strictly logically stronger than
Supervenience on Grounds.
Proof. We first show that ground-indiscernibility entails fundamental indiscernibility.
For suppose that w and w0 are not fundamentally indiscernible. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that some fact A is fundamental in w but not in w0.
Consider the unique A-sequence f in w, whose domain is the ordinal 1. Clearly f is
maximal. Since A is not fundamental in w0, f is not a maximal w0-sequence. Hence f is
not 0-convergent in w0; and since it stops after f ð0Þ ¼ A, it fails to be β-convergent in
w0 for any ordinal β. It follows that w and w0 are not ground-indiscernible. However,
the converse does not hold. Let world w consist of the denumerably many facts
A0;A1 . . . , with Aiþ1 < Ai for all integers i, and world w0 of the denumerably many
facts B0;B1 . . . , with Biþ1 < Bi and Ai  Bj for all integers i and j. Then w and w0 are
fundamentally indiscernible, since neither contains any fundamental facts. However,
f, defined on ω, with f ðiÞ ¼ Ai is a maximal w-sequence that fails to be β-convergent
in w0 for any ordinal β. ■
Proposition 4. Entailment entails Supervenience on Grounds.
Proof. Assume that Entailment holds, and that w and w0 fail to be factually indis-
cernible. Suppose, without loss of generality, that some fact of w does not obtain in
w0. We shall define a maximal w-sequence f such that f ðβÞ does not obtain in w0, for
any β. This sequence fails to be β-convergent in w0 for any β, and hence w and w0 are
not ground-indiscernible.
Let Dww0 be the class of facts that obtain in w but not in w
0. Fix A 2 Dww0 , and say σ
is a Dww0 -sequence if it is either empty or an A-sequence in w all of whose elements are
in Dww0 . Define a function h on the class of D
w
w0 -sequences as follows: hðgÞ ¼ fhg;Aig if
g is not s-grounded in w; otherwise hðgÞ ¼ fhg;Bi : B 2 Dww0 and B 2 Γ, for some Γ
that is an s-ground of g in wg. Clearly, the members of fhðgÞ : g a Dww0 -sequenceg are
pairwise disjoint. We now show that all of them are non-empty. Case (i): There is no
s-ground of g in w. Then hg;Ai 2 hðgÞ. Case (ii): Γ is an s-ground of g in w. Then
there is some B in some final segment of g such that Γ < B in w. By Entailment, B
holds in every possible world where all members of Γ hold. Since B 2 Dww0 , some
member C of Γ is also in Dww0 . So hg;Ci 2 hðgÞ, and hðgÞ is therefore non-empty. By
the Axiom of Choice, there is a class that contains exactly one representative from
each member of fhðgÞ : g a Dww0 -sequenceg. Since this is a class of ordered pairs, we
take it to be a function h0 that maps a Dww0 -sequence to a member of D
w
w0 .
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We now use recursion to define a sequence by f 0(0) = A and f 0ðαÞ ¼ h0ðf 0↾αÞ. As a
class of ordinals, sA ¼ fα : f 0ðαÞ ¼ A and α > 0g is either empty or has a least member
γ. Let f be f 0 if sA is empty, and f 0↾γ if it is not.
It is now straightforward to verify that f is a maximal A-sequence in w, and that
all elements of f are in Dww0 . ■
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